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The Role of Farm Size in Crop Insurance 
 
The role of farm size in crop insurance has been a reoc-
curring U.S. political issue with multiple attempts at 
legislation proposing to limit premium subsidies to 
large producers. For instance, in 2015 bill S.2244, 
amongst other items, proposed to cap crop insurance 
premium subsidies at $40,000 per year1. The most re-
cent attempt was made by the current administration 
in mid-2017, where they introduced the same premi-
um subsidy cap of $40,000 per year. The first mention 
of the $40,000 figure emerged from a report sanctioned 
by the Government Accountability Office in 2012 
(GAO-14-700, 2014)2. Eventually no premium subsidy 
caps were included in the 2018 Farm Bill due to push 
back from farm and insurance groups3. However, pre-
mium subsidy restrictions have continually remained 
at the forefront of crop insurance policy debate since 
2012.  
If excess crop insurance returns by large producers 
exist, then they would have a competitive advantage 
over their smaller counterparts, as the latter would not 
have the financial ability to compete for resources. For 
example, additional financial resources may be used in 
the land rental and/or purchase market. A relation be-
tween farm size and crop insurance returns would pro-
vide evidence that crop insurance inefficiently reallo-
cates resources. However, if larger producers are not 
garnering excess returns from crop insurance, then any 
government policy limiting their participation (for ex-
________________________ 
1 https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/news/press/shaheen-flake-
introduce-crop-insurance-reform-bill-with-24-billion-in-
savings 
2 https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/us/cap-on-farm-
insurance-subsidy-could-save-billions-report-says.html  
3 https://www.farmprogress.com/insurance/caps-crop-
insurance-subsidy-would-hit-family-farms  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  9-13-19 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  173.87  173.82  159.99 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  159.04  156.48  147.14 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  205.09  216.04  222.61 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  51.69  *  NA 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71.19  87.97  69.55 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  150.61  159.96  152.51 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  380.85  395.17  399.44 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4.45  3.45  3.57 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.09  3.87  3.74 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  7.04  7.77  7.96 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  496  5.98  5.63 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.82  3.01  3.06 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  102.50  115.00  105.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  102.50  100.00  105.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  133.50  136.50  137.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44.50  40.50  42.50 
 ⃰ No Market          
 ample a reduction in premium subsidies via some type of 
cap on total premium subsidies) could change the pool of 
insured in a way that would not be advantageous to the 
health of the federal crop insurance program. Changing 
the pool of insured could result in increased premiums 
for participating producers. Increasing premiums also 
results in higher government costs since both premium 
subsidies and Administrative and Operating (A&O) sub-
sidies are applied as a percentage of total premium. High-
er premiums with higher subsidies also imply fewer acres 
needed to hit a total premium subsidy cap. Evaluating 
whether larger producers receive more in crop insurance 
than smaller producers represents an important contribu-
tion to the literature given the reoccurring political pres-
sure proposing the limitation of premium subsidies.  
Historical county loss cost (indemnity/liability) represents 
the primary calculation driving crop insurance premium 
rating (Coble et al. 2010)4. Loss costs are calculated for 
specific county production characteristics, for example, 
the crop grown and farming practice such as irrigated or 
rain fed, or summer fallow or continuous crop. While this 
tailoring of premiums is aimed at improving actuarial 
performance, it is possible that other farm specific charac-
teristics influence indemnity payments. For the producer, 
this could mean the opportunity for excess returns be-
yond what the government intends since those character-
istics are not found in the premium rating method. For 
the government, excess producer returns imply an ineffi-
cient program due to a misallocation of resources and 
increase in taxpayer cost. In this article, we empirically 
examine the impact of farm size on returns from crop 
insurance participation. Specifically, we evaluate whether 
larger producers are riskier than smaller producers. Our 
analysis is based on the principle that since this character-
istic is not part of the premium generating process, they 
should be neutral to the return from insurance. Investi-
gating the role of farm size gives insights into how much 
influence farm structure heterogeneity has on the return 
from crop insurance participation.  
In our evaluation of the impact of farm size on the return 
from crop insurance, we base our definition of farm size 
on the total number of insured acres by each producer. 
Since we only observe insured acreage in our data set, we 
likely underestimate farm size due to acreage on uninsur-
able crops or crops that were not insured. Since we are 
interested in the impact of larger farms versus the average 
impact of an additional acre, we break our farm size data 
into six size categories: producers (1) greater than 2000 
acres , (2) between 1000 and 1999 acres, (3) between 500 
_________________ 
4 Premiums are also loaded from state, miscellaneous 
(prevented planting, replant, quality adjustment) and disaster 
reserve factor loads.   
and 999 acres, (4) between 200 and 499, (5) between 
100 and 199 and (6) less than 100. This approach of six 
distinct categories allows for a better comparison be-
tween very large and small farms than offered by the 
USDA farm size categories and better than inspecting 
the marginal value of an additional acre. We are inter-
ested in the outcomes from the tails of the acreage dis-
tribution. 
To evaluate the relevance of farm and producer charac-
teristics, we focus on the return from crop insurance as 
a function of crop insurance contract choices, farm 
characteristics and unobserved temporal and spatial 
effects. 
We use a highly detailed unit-level crop insurance da-
taset obtained from USDA’s Risk Management Agency 
for our analysis. The analysis is conducted in four re-
gions and five crops for the period 1996 to 2009, allow-
ing us to evaluate differences between regions, leading 
to improved understanding of region-specific crop in-
surance impacts. The four regions analyzed are Nebras-
ka, Iowa, Montana and Oklahoma. We have data for 
canola, corn and soybean producers in Iowa. Corn, soy-
beans and wheat data for Nebraska. Montana consists 
of Barley and Wheat (both winter and spring), and in 
Oklahoma we have cotton and wheat 
Results 
Marginal effects to evaluate our hypothesis that farm 
size is neutral to crop insurance are presented in Table 
1. Significant and positive marginal effects on farm size 
and/or insured type provide evidence of excess returns. 
For farm size, we do not find any evidence of excess 
returns by larger farms in any of the four regions. This 
runs counter to the results provided by Coble and Wil-
liams (2018) and may be explained by the fact that we 
account for the net return from crop insurance across 
fourteen years while they focus on only indemnities for 
one year. We do find support for the alternate hypothe-
sis that larger farms receive less return than their small-
er counterparts. Support for the converse hypothesis 
was found in both Iowa and Nebraska in three of the six 
size categories in Iowa and two of six size categories in 
Nebraska.  
Conclusions 
This paper examined the relation of farm size on the 
return from crop insurance participation in four re-
gions and five crops. Our approach is empirical, span-
ning 14 years (1996 to 2009) across 4 regions and 5 
crops at the per acre level. Our goal was to evaluate 
whether larger producers are riskier than smaller pro-
ducers. We approach our problem by analyzing the per 
acre net return from crop insurance participation  
rather than relying on totals. Comparing per acre net re-
turns allows us to more accurately examine insurance out-
come differences between farm sizes. Our empirical findings 
contribute to the debate on whether large farms receive 
more back from insurance participation than their smaller 
counterparts.  
Our findings fail to find support for the hypothesis that 
larger producers obtain more in returns from insurance 
than their smaller counterparts in any of the analyzed crops 
and regions. Finding evidence that larger producers are not 
receiving significantly more from insurance over their 
smaller counterparts suggests that any policy limiting par-
ticipation of larger producers could negatively impact the 
insurance pool. Insurance rates would likely go up for the 
remaining participants, resulting in higher producer premi-
ums and higher premium subsidy expenses, thereby also 
negatively impacting taxpayers. Recall that premium subsi-
dy is applied as a percentage of premium so increasing the 
premium results in more premium subsidy dollars per acre. 
In fact, we find support of the converse hypothesis that larg-
er producers in Iowa get less back than their smaller coun-
terparts in one of the four regions. However, estimated pa-
rameters are small, indicating a small economic effect. A 
result indicating the RMA is doing a good job at estimating 
crop insurance premiums.  
 
 
For a complete copy of the working paper please contact Cory 
Walters at cwalters7@unl.edu  
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Variables Iowa Montana Nebraska Oklahoma 
Size 
(Base = 0 to 99 acres)       
100 to 199 -1.43 -0.02 NA 0.18 
200 to 499  -1.30** 0.02 0.53 0.07 
500 to 999  -0.94*** 0.00  -1.22*** 0.27 
1000 to 1999  0.75*** 0.06 -0.66** 0.20 
>2000 -0.57** 0.20 -0.32 0.39 
Notes: ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Table 1: Results – Farm Size Marginal Effects, $ per acre.  
